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Volume 44 Spring 1979 Number 2
THE OPINION CLAUSE AND
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING
NEIL THOMAS PROTO*
The President's power to act is derived first and foremost from the
Constitution. His exercise of that power, when challenged in a judicial
rather than a political forum, may provoke a confrontation not only be-
tween him and his particular adversary but between the President and the
other branches of government. Examples of this confrontation are neces-
sarily rare, for the executive is no less cautious to strain its relations with
the other branches than the judiciary is to resolve controversies on con-
stitutional grounds when a "legal ground of less explosive potentialities is
properly available."' The infrequency of such a confrontation, however,
only dramatizes its significance; and regardless of the ultimate judicial
resolution, an inquiry into the scope and nature of the power claimed by
the President is essential for historical as well as legal purposes.
The purpose of this article is to inquire into the meaning of article II,
section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution. This provision, referred to here as
the "Opinion Clause," provides:
The President ... may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the duties of their respective offices....
It is, however, an inquiry undertaken in light of some important consider
ations which must be set forth at the outset.
The meaning of the Opinion Clause is relatively obscure. Indeed,
although the Constitution has been the subject of interpretation for almost
200 years, there is an absence of dispositive judicial guidance. Certainly
* Attorney, Appellate Section, Land and Natural Resources Division,
United States Department of Justice; M.A., 1969, School of Public and Interna-
tional Affairs, George Washington University; J.D., 1972, George Washington
University.
The views expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice.
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Justice Jackson's reflection in Youngstown Sheet & tube Co. v. Sawyer 2 is
equally applicable to the inquiry undertaken here:
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the
poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to
concrete problems of executive power as they actually present
themselves. Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined
from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was
called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of par-
tisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only
supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on
each side of any question. 3
This absence of judicial guidance requires, of course, that one look first to
the Framers of the Constitution and their deliberations in Philadelphia in
the Summer and Fall of 1787. 4 Fortunately, this task is, in one sensesome-
what less difficult than that confronting attorneys immediately after the
Constitutional Convention. Since the founding of the Republic, legal com-
mentators have fully explored the Constitution's provisions and have com-
piled and analyzed the writings and thoughts of the various notables of the
times. But the Framers, no less than members of other more contemporary
deliberative bodies, did not always reveal their intentions with absolute
clarity. Consequently, a review of the Philadelphia debates provides only a
foundation for further inquiry into the meaning of the Opinion Clause.
The absence of judicial guidance also presents another analytical
dilemma: how to evaluate the political dimension of the decision-making
process. A review of the debates at Philadelphia surrounding the inclusion
of the Opinion Clause in the Constitution indicates the Framers were
acutely sensitive to the distribution of power among the three branches of
government and the significance of having a chief executive with a na-
tional rather than a regional constituency. 5 Moreover, the Presidency has,
from the outset, been a "political" office. The President is always the
titular, if not the real, head of his political party, and he is elected, in part,
because of some professed philosophical or "political" perception of what
he thinks ought to be done.
Additionally, the task of now assessing the meaning of the Opinion
Clause occurs subsequent to numerous social and technological changes
and in the context of notions concerning good government and sound
social policy that are very different from those confronting the nation in its
formative years. In attempting, therefore, to understand both the mean-
ing of the Opinion Clause and the manner of its application to a particular
2. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3. Id. at 634.
4. See J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION (2d ed.
1836); J. MADSION, DEBATES TO THE FEDERA.IST CONVENTION (Int'l ed. 1920).
5. See, e.g., J. MADISON, supra note 4, at 50 (Debates ofJune 2, 1787), 527
(Debates of September 7, 1787).
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array of facts, it should be kept in mind that the tapestry of government is
woven from both law and politics. This is particularly true when the
decision-making process is activated at the request of the President of the
United States.
In North Dakota v. Andrus,6 the State of North Dakota sought to
enjoin the transmission of a report prepared by the President's Water
Resources Council to the President until an Environmental Impact State-
ment was prepared pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969. 7 The Justice Department-on behalf of the
President, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
the Secretary of the Interior and the Chairman of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) -contended that when the President requests an
opinion in writing from his close advisers preliminary to making a presi-
dential decision on federal water policy, that process cannot be interfered
with or in any manner conditioned by either the legislative or judicial
branches of government. It is protected fully by the Opinion Clause of the
Constitution. Although the controversy was ultimately disposed of on
other grounds, the facts and arguments presented in North Dakota v.
Andrus provide a convenient framework for examining this provision of
the Constitution.
With these considerations in mind, this article will: (1) review the facts
and legal arguments presented in North Dakota v. Andrus, with particular
reference to the Justice Department's explanation of the Opinion Clause
and the manner in which the district court and court of appeals disposed of
it; (2) examine the history of the Opinion Clause's inclusion in the Con-
stitution in order to assess the Framer's intentions; (3) examine the
political, administrative and legal notions behind the argument that the
President's right to acquire information and advice in the course of ex-
ecutive decision-making is protected by the Opinion Clause; and (4) iden-
tify the possible limitations on the power and the protection the clause may
provide the presidential decision-making process.
I. NORTH DAKOTA V. ANDRUS
In 1977 President Carter requested his Water Resources Council to
prepare a report on future water resource policy matters for his considera-
tion and study. After the Council began preparing the report without also
preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), as required by sec-
tion 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,8 North
Dakota filed suit to enjoin the report's transmission to the President until
an EIS was prepared.
6. 11 ENVIR. REP.,(BNA) 1543 (D.N.D. March 10, 1978), rev'd, No.
78-1194 (8th Cir. March 21, 1978), stay denied byJustice Blackmun (March 23,
1978).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970).
8. Id.
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The federal defendants first moved to dismiss the President as a party.
This motion was granted by the district court. On behalf of the remaining
defendants, the Government filed a motion to dismisi the complaint "for
the reason that the court lacks jurisdiction to condition communications
requested by the President from his closest advisors. 9 In its memorandum
in support of the motion the Government contended that under the Opin-
ion Clause the three officials preparing the report at the President's re-
quest were protected from the statutory requirement that an Environmen-
tal Impact Statement be prepared.
At the heart of this case is an effort by the State of North Dakota to
impose conditions on the uninhibited flow of information and ad-
vice between the President and his closest advisors and cabinet
members when the President has requested such advice. However,
both the drafters of the U.S. Constitution and the federal courts
have recognized that neither Congress nor the courts can impose
conditions on the President's right to such advice.
In a short list of enumerated Presidential powers, Article II, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 1, the "Opinion Clause," provides that the President
"may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to
the Duties of their respective Offices. . . ." The integrity of this
prerogative is necessary for the effective functioning and inde-
pendence of the Executive Branch.10
The district court denied the Government's motion to dismiss and
granted injunctive relief in favor of North Dakota.11 In doing so, the court
characterized the President's proposal for policy reform- and implicitly;
his request for an "opinion in writing" -as a "proposal for major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."1 2
Furthermore, the court characterized the response of the three federal
officials to the President's request as "a recommendation or report on pro-
posals for a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." Consequently, the court concluded, an Environ-
merital Impact Statement would have to be prepared and properly cir-
culated prior to the report's submission to the President. However, the
court's order did not rest on "legal" matters alone. It was also keenly aware
of the "nonlegal" factors underlying the state's lawsuit. Following the oral
argument on the motion to dismiss, the court stated:
9. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, North
Dakota v. Andrus, 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1543 (D.N.D. March 10, 1978), rev'd,
No. 78-1194 (8th Cir. March 21, 1978), stay denied by Justice Blackmun (March
23, 1977).
10. Id. at 2-3.
11. 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1543 (D.N.D. March 10, 1978), rev'd, No.
78-1194 (8th Cir. March 21, 1978), stay denied by Justice Blackmun (March 23,
1977).
12. Id. at 1544.
188 [Vol. 44
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/1
THE OPINION CLAUSE
I, of course, have known the upper central states. I can remember
from the time that Fort Peck was being considered, the dreams of
the people .... [W]hen I consider the catastrophe that is being
visited on the inland states by the failure of the Secretary of the In-
terior to give consideration to the impact of what is developing, I
feel that there must be some remedy in the law, and the first step,
of course, is information, and the environmental impact provision
of the law would allow of that- the gathering of that information.
I do not feel that it is fair to those who must bear the brunt of these
changes that they shall not be allowed to be heard until such time
as the President has made his final decision. 13
The result of the district court's order was to preclude the President from
reviewing the report he had requested until after the public, the Congress
and the judiciary had reviewed it. This indeed was a constitutionally
anamolous result. The district court certified the constitutional question
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), and the Government appealed.
On appeal, the Government again urged that the court lacked juris-
diction under the Constitution because the precise activity involved in the
case was protected by the Opinion Clause.' 4 In addition, it argued that the
advisory and tentative nature of the report, and the fact that it would not
be accompanied by any concrete instruments of implementation (such as
proposed Executive Orders, draft legislation, or proposed amendments to
agency rules and regulations) indicated that the policy review process was
still in the "germination" stage. Consequently, an Environmental Impact
Statement was not yet required.' 5
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals avoided the constitutional ques-
tion raised in the Government's brief and decided the case on statutory
grounds. 16 The court of appeals vacated the injunction on two grounds,
13. Transcript of Hearing 42-43 (March 7, 1978), North Dakota v. Andrus,
11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1543 (D.N.D. March 10, 1978), rev'd, No. 78-1194 (8th
Cir. March 21, 1978), stay denied by justice Blackmun (March 23, 1977).
14. The Government was cautious to add the following qualification:
This Court does, of course, have the authority to determine whether the
Executive's claim to a form of constitutionally protected activity is in fact
provided for expressly or impliedly in the Constitution. Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962). We do not claim independence from that kind ofjudicial review.
Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
Brief for Appellants at 13-14, North Dakota v. Andrus, No. 78-1194 (8th Cir.
March 21, 1978), stay denied by justice Blackmun (March 23, 1978).
15. Id. at 25-32. The Government made clear, however, that "should a
decision ultimately be made that the Secretary of Interior should formulate and
propose legislation to Congress, an EIS would be prepared for the use of Congress
as it considers the bill, provided, of course, that the bill would have a significant
effect on the quality of the human environment." Id. at 26-27.
16. In declining to resolve the constitutional question the court followed the
maxim that a constitutional determination should be avoided if a statutory one
19791
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having concluded that: (1) under the circumstances an EIS was not re-
quired in light of Kleppe v. Sierra Club,1 7 and (2) the State of North
Dakota had failed to show irreparable harm. Having decided the case on
the basis of these findings the court deemed it unnecessary to reach the
constitutional issue raised by the Government.' On March 23, 1978, Mr.
Justice Blackmun denied North Dakota's application for a stay of the court
of appeals mandate. The President now has the Report on Federal Water
Policy he requested.
The manner in which the district court and court of appeals disposed
of the controversy in North Dakota v. Andrus avoided direct confrontation
with the meaning of the Opinion Clause urged by the Government. It was
to no avail that the Government sought to interpose the Opinion Clause as
a jurisdictional bar that must be examined prior to any assessment of the
merits. The court of appeals made it clear that it had transposed the
Government's jurisdictional constitutional contention into the more tradi-
tional constitutional mold (i.e., the constitutional question should be
reached only after the statutory question is resolved). The result is that the
Opinion Clause remains largely unexplored by the judicial branch.
This article turns now to an inquiry into the meaning of the Opinion
Clause, drawing, in part, upon the Government's argument in North
Dakota v. Andrus, the experience of those responsible for the inclusion of
the Opinion Clause in the Constitution, and the experience of writers and
practitioners in law and government.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The Framers entered the city of Philadelphia with a variety of thoughts
and notions concerning the structure of the federal government. None was
will suffice. See generally Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69
(1947). This traditional admonition is not without its critics. As Judge Friendly
points out, this technique of statutory interpretation is unlikely to reflect congres-
sional intent:
It does not seem in any way obvious, as a matter of interpretation,
that the legislature would prefer a narrow construction which does not
raise constitutional doubts to a broader one which does raise them....
Although questioning the doctrine of construction to avoid constitu-
tional doubts is rather like challenging Holy Writ, the rule has always
seemed to me to have almost as many dangers as advantages .... [I]t is
one of those rules that courts apply when they want and conveniently
forget when they don't-some, perhaps, would consider that to be a vir-
tue .... [T]he rule of "construing" to avoid constitutional doubts should,
in my view, be confined to cases where the doubt is exceedingly real.
Otherwise this rule, whether it be denominated one of statutory interpre-
tation or, more accurately, of constitutional adjudication-still more ac-
curately, of constitutional nonadjudication-is likely to become one of
evisceration and tergiversation.
H. FRIENDLY, Mr.Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, BENCHMARKS
210-12 (1976).
17. 426 U.S. 390 (1976).
18. The court of appeals order was not reported.
[Vol. 44190
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more profound or perhaps more widely discussed than the concept usually
attributed to the French nobleman and philosopher Montesquieu; name-
ly, the separation of government into three branches- the executive, the
legislature, and the judiciary. 19
The separation of powers concept provides the essential political
underpinning of the Constitution. By distributing the power of govern-
ment among three branches, each with assigned functions, the Framers
sought to avoid the disruptive consequence of concentrating it in one
branch. The effective functioning of this form of governance requires that
each separate "department should be kept completely independent of the
others -independent not in the sense that they shall not cooperate to the
common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the Constitution, but
in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by, or subjected,
directly or indirectly, to the coercive influence of either of the other
departments." 20
Yet, the "separateness" was never intended to be absolute. In design-
ing our system of government, the Framers also intended that "checks and
balances" be placed upon the exercise of power by each branch. As Mr.
Justice Story explained:
19. C. MONTESQUIEU, ON THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748). See generally 9 W.
DURANT & A. DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION 347-60 (1965), for an in-
formative discussion of the origins of Montesquieu's ideas and the reaction to his
SPIRIT OF LAWS.
While Montesquieu's notion concerning the tripartite separation of govern-
ment provided the theoretical foundation for the Framers' discussions, Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-21 (1976), it was largely the English and colonial experi-
ence that provided the raison d'etre for distributing the powers and duties of
government among the three branches. As will be discussed below, the Framers
relied explicitly on this experience during discussions at Philadelphia. See also
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 90-91, 100 (1926).
20. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933). See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683(1974); Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). In THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 47, James Madison summarized the essential meaning of Montesquieu's
concept:
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further
demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no
liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or
senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical man-
ner." Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for
the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."
Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but
briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning
which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) at 338-39 (B. Wright ed. 1962).
1979]
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[W]hen we speak of a separation of the three great depart-
ments of government, and maintain that that separation is indis-
pensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a
limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept
wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common
link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the
slightest degree. 21
It was within this general framework of a tripartite system of government
that the Framers turned their attention to the powers of the executive. 22
The decision to place the responsibility of the executive branch in a
single person- the President-was not lightly made by the Framers. While
some delegates may have contemplated, and even suggested, a "commit-
tee" executive, 23 the more serious proposals concerned the establishment
of a "council" with authority commensurate with that of the President.
This proposed system was, in part, based on the experience-of various co-
lonial governments, which used a Governor and Executive Council, 24 and
the governments established subsequent to the revolution. 25 It reflected
the concern of the Framers that in a republican form of government no
one person should have the authority of a monarch. 26
These proposals did not reach fruition. An executive consisting of a
single person was finally established by the Constitutional Convention on
July 26, 1787.27 But the notion of formally designating more than one per-
son as constituting the executive was the focus of considerable attention
both before and after that date. Moreover, and of particular importance
to this inquiry, efforts were made to define the relationship among these
persons and to place separately formal responsibility in each for the opera-
tion of the executive's duties.
21. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 442 n.5 (1977)
(quoting 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 525 (5th ed.
1905)).
22. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
23. In many of the early colonial charters, particularly those for the
northeastern states, committees of three, five, or seven persons were selected by
"general consent" to govern the town. See W. KAVENAGH, FOUNDATIONS OF
COLONIAL AMERICA 603 (1973).
24. E. GREEN, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF
NORTH AMERICA 72-90 (1966).
25. In THE FEDERALIST No. 70, Hamilton notes that only New York and
New Jersey, among the various states, had entrusted the executive authority to
only one person. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A. Hamilton) at 452 (B. Wright ed.
1962).
26. See L. CALDWELL, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THEORIES OF HAMILTON AND
JEFFERSON, THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THOUGHT ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
25, 151 (1944). This work relies heavily on the writings and correspondence of
Hamilton and Jefferson. See also 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 379 (Luther Martin's Letter) (2d ed. 1836). Similar views are contain-
ed in THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
27. J. ELLIOT, supra note 26, at 219 (Debates of July 26, 1787).
[Vol. 44
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On June 2, 1787, Messrs. Rutledge and Pinkney of South Carolina
moved the convention to specify "one person" as the executive.28 Mr. Ran-
dolph of Virginia opposed a one person executive "with great earnestness"
beause "the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very sem-
blance of Monarchy." 29 Messrs. Rutledge and Pinkney of South Carolina
disagreed. They suggested that the reasons in favor of one person were
"obvious and conclusive. ' 30 They received the support of Mr. Butler of
South Carolina who "contended strongly for a single magistrate." 31
The debate continued with apparent intensity onJune 4, 1787, as the
convention, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, resumed consideration
of the Rutledge-Pinkney motion. Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania, who sup-
ported the notion of a single executive, expressed his concern that "tran-
quility not less than vigor of the Gov[ernment] . . .would be favored by
it."132 He explained his concern to the convention:
Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncon-
trolled, continued, [and] violent animosities; which would . ..
only interrupt the public administration.... If equal, the making
them an odd number would not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice
there are two sides only to a question. In the Legislative [and] Ex-
ecutive depart[ments] questions have commonly many sides. Each
member therefore might espouse a separate one [and] no two
agree. 33
Mr. Sherman of Connecticut agreed but reminded Mr. Wilson "that in all
states there was a Council of advice, without which the first magistrate
could not act."3' 4 Wilson made clear, however, that he did not advocate the
inclusion of a council, "which," he said, "oftener serves to cover, than pre-
vent malpractices. " 35 The proposal for a single executive was approved. 36
On August 20, 1787, a proposition was made to establish a "council of
State" in order to "assist the President in conducting public affairs." 37 This
28. See J. MADISON, supra note 4, at 48 (Debates of June 2, 1787).
29. Id. at 49.
30. Id. at 48.
31. Id. at 49. Mr. Butler thought that one person would most likely "answer
the purpose of the remote parts" of the country. He stated that if "one man should
be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its
interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be
a constant struggle for local advantages." Paradoxically, this concern for the
"purpose of the remote parts" is not unlike the district court's concern in North
Dakota v. Andrus for the "catastrophe that is being visited on the inland states"
by the actions of the executive sitting in Washington. While Butler was confident
a single magistrate would protect the "remote parts," the district court in Andrus
seemed less confident. 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1544.




36. Id. at 51.
37. J. ELLIOT, supra note 26, at 250 (Debates of August 20, 1787).
1931979]
9
Proto: Proto: Opinion Clause and Presidential Decision-Making
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
council was to be composed of the Secretaries of Domestic Affairs, Com-
merce and Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, State and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. It was contemplated that:
[The] President may, from time to time, submit any matter to the
discussion of the council of state; and he may require the written
opinions of any one or more of the members; but he shall in all
cases, exercise his own judgment, and either conform to such opin-
ions, or not, as he may think proper. And every officer above men-
tioned shall be responsible for his opinion on the affairs relating to
his particular departmentA
Effectively, this would have made the President and his advisers inde-
pendently accountable for such opinions, even though the President was
not required to conform to those opinions. Thus, while supporting a single
executive, the Framers had not yet reached the point of reposing sole ac-
countability in the President for opinions and advice.
This proposal for a council of state was then modified by a special com-
mittee of the convention, and in its place a "Privy Council" was suggested
"whose duty it shall be to advise [the President] in matters respecting the
execution of his office, which he shall think proper to lay before them; but
their advice shall not conclude him, nor affect his responsibility for the
measures which he shall adopt."3 9 Mr. Mason of Virginia supported this
proposal. 40 He suggested that the Privy Council to the President be com-
posed of six members, "two out of the Eastern, two out of the middle, and
two out of the Southern quarters of the Union .... ,41 This proposal also
failed. The convention's delegates rejected the proposition that the Presi-
dent's accountability be shared, and his relationship with the other officers
in his department be defined by constitutional mandate. Instead, the con-
vention decided on the language that presently constitutes the Opinion
Clause: "[The President] may require the opinion in writing of the prin-
cipal officer in each of the executive departments upon any subject
relating to the duties of their respective offices."142
Ultimately, what emerged from the convention was the notion that the
President has singular and ultimate accountability for his own decisions,
and that he would have the power, prior to making any formal proposals,
to request the opinions in writing of his closest advisers in a manner that
would best assist him in the execution of his duties. More importantly, the
convention rejected proposals: (1) to designate the Chief Justice of the
judicial branch as an ex officio member of the President's advisory body;
(2) to require the President to have a particular institutional arrangement
for gathering advice; and (3) to make the President's advisers independ-
38. Id. at 251 (Debates of August 20, 1787) (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 257 (Debates of August 22, 1787).
40. J. MADISON, supra note 28, at 527 (Debates of September 7, 1787).
41. Id.
42. J. ELLIOT, supra note 26, at 293 (Debates of September 7, 1787).
[Vol. 44194
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/1
THE OPINION CLAUSE
ently responsible for their respective opinions. The juxtaposition of the
power the President was granted and the restrictions on that power which
were rejected suggests that the Framers expressly granted the President a
discrete sphere of control over the process by which he gathers the infor-
mation necessary to make a decision; a process that -within the context of
the separation of powers-cannot be interfered with by the other two
branches of government.
But this assessment of what emerged from the convention, while in-
structive, does not, standing alone, provide a sufficient rationale for the
meaning of the Opinion Clause suggested by the Government in North
Dakota v. Andrus. In order to add the necessary clarity it is essential to ex-
amine some of the political, administrative and legal notions related to the
"need ... of any single Chief Executive to... draw upon the advice of
others in exercising his political power [and] as an aid to intelligent and in-
formed decision-making. 43 These notions, some of which were reflected
in the debates in Philadelphia, demonstrate the importance, as a constitu-
tional matter, of permitting the President to exercise his power to "require
the opinion in writing" of his closest advisers without the imposition of
judicial or legislative restraints.
III. NOTIONS OF POLITICS
There are two general, albeit related, notions which underlie the con-
stitutional protection the Opinion Clause provides the President. These
are: (1) the importance of assuring that matters of politics are integrated
fully into the decision-making process; and (2) that the President be per-
mitted to acquire the information and advice necessary to control and
direct the actions of the executive branch, including the execution of the
laws. These two notions are, in their effect on the quality of government,
opposite sides of the same coin. This section will address only the notion of
politics. The following section will address the notions of control and
direction.
The President is a political person. He is nominated for office by a
political party, however divergent its views, and he campaigns on the par-
ty's platform and on his own. In order to govern, the President must be
conscious of his popularity and the relationship between his decisions and
their effect on the constituencies that lent him support or whose support he
seeks. At times, the President is obligated to make "political" judgments
that are in the interest of the nation or a discrete segment of it; judgments
that neither please his supporters nor gain him additional ones. These
decisions and judgments are tempered by a variety of factors which the
President must weigh and balance and which necessarily affect his assess-
ment of what constitutes the "public interest" at a particular moment and
in a particular context.
43. R. FENNO, JR., THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET 9 (1959).
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As a matter of law, and certainly of politics, the President is required
to make the actual decisions and to remain accountable for the conse-
quences. However, the process of making the decision-gathering the
facts, defining the problem, assessing the consequences, identifying alter-
natives-has always involved the use of Presidential advisers. 44 In this
regard, Presidents since George Washington have gathered around them
persons of wisdom, knowledgeable in the affairs of government or in mat-
ters of politics, whom they trust and may consult regularly and in confi-
dence. 45 They may be cabinet officials, 46 special assistants, or some
combination of persons brought together only for a special purpose 47 or as
part of an ongoing institutional arrangement. Most importantly, however,
is that "[flrom the outset all [advisers and] heads of departments stood in
quasi-political relation to the President. '48 Chief Justice Marshall, who
had been Secretary of State and chief adviser to President Adams,
acknowledged fully the "intimate political relation, subsisting between the
President... and the heads of departments"; 49 an appreciation that was
also shared by Chief Justice Taft, himself a former chief executive, more
than a hundred years later in Myers v. United States.50 "[T]oday this rela-
tionship has become the dominant characteristic of the offices con-
cerned." 5
This political dimension of the decision-making process is a critical
part of the President's request to his advisers for opinions and the timeli-
ness and candor of their response. Both the President and his advisers must
not only be able to assess fully the political consequences of their possible
actions, but must also be receptive to the opinions and attitudes of those
44. The Opinion Clause provides a modicum of protection to a process
which occurs within the presidential office and not to a particular institutional ar-
rangement (e.g., President-Secretary of State, President-National Security Ad-
visor). The fact that presidents have chosen a variety of mechanisms for institu-
tionalizing the opinion-gathering process only substantiates the importance of
focusing on the manner in which the opinion is requested and received rather
than on the structural relationship between the President and his adviser.
45. See generally T. SORENSEN, DECISION MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE,
THE OLIVE BRANCH OR THE ARROWS 57-77 (1963); R. NEUSTADT, PRES-
IDENTIAL POWER, THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 152-80 (1960).
46. See R. FENNO, JR., supra note 43, at 9-50.
47. President Kennedy, for example, often relied upon a "task force" com-
posed of individuals from divergent segments of the White House staff or from
within the executive branch generally, rather than existing institutional ar-
rangements. These groups would often disband after serving their purpose, or
they might continue and expand in number. See, e.g., R. HILSMAN, To MOVE A
NATION 27, 38 (1967); R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS, A MEMOIR OFTHE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS 30-31 (1969).
48. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power, 27 COLUM. L. REV.
353, 393 (1927).
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169 (1803).
50. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
51. Corwin, supra note 48, at 393.
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who look uniquely to the President to consider their interests. Moreover,
the President must be free to consider the often subtle relationship be-
tween and among seemingly unrelated actions, and to bring his own polit-
ical judgment to bear upon the determination of government policy. For
this political process to operate fully- as it must if the President is to fulfill
his constitutional obligations -the process of requesting opinions and ad-
vice should not be encumbered or conditioned by the other branches of
government. To permit such interference would largely alter the balance
of power. The President would not merely be subjected to a presumed
commonality of interest with the judiciary and Congress but, in fact,
would be wholly precluded from competing with the perceptions and
values those branches reflect. The process of decision-making in the White
House would become ineffectual, and the President and his advisers could
no longer be held politically accountable for their decisions.
It is worth reiterating at this juncture that the Opinion Clause protects
the freedom of the President to gather information prior to making a deci-
sion. It does not protect the actual implementation of the decision. As the
Justice Department's reply brief stated in North Dakota v. Andrus:
[The Framers] placed sole accountability in the President, and
permitted him the prerogative to request opinions in writing, on
matters political and governmental in nature, from his advisors
concerning the most appropriate way to fulfill his own duties. This
prerogative, only when exercised in the narrow confines of the
"Opinion Clause," is protected from encumbrance by the Con-
gress or this Court. Once the opinion is received and assessed by
the President, any proposal (i.e., legislation, regulations) made by
a subordinate, pursuant to a decision by the President, is fully sub-
ject to the imposition of conditions by the Congress and this
Court. 2
Thus, the notion of politics provides a rationale only for a limited sphere of
unconditioned presidential decision-making. In his Handbook on Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, Henry Black recognized this distinction between
seeking opinions and making a concrete proposal subsequent to a deci-
sion.5 3 He noted that the President has often requested written opinions
from his advisers, "not merely upon subjects relating to the duties of their
several departments, but upon all questions of administrative policy, both
domestic and foreign."54 Once this process is completed, however, the ac-
tions of the President and his advisers assume a different posture:
[W]hile the heads of the executive departments are under the
direction and control of the President in respect to such duties as
52. Reply Brief for Appellant 6-7, North Dakota v. Andrus, No. 78-1194(8th Cir. March 21, 1978), stay denied by Justice Blackmun (March 23, 1978)
(footnotes omitted).
53. H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed.
1910).
54. Id. at 118.
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involve political action and the exercise of judgment and discre-
tion, and cannot be controlled or coerced by congress or the
courts, this principle must not be carried so far as to make them
amenable only to the orders of the President in respect to the ex-
ecution of specific duties imposed upon them by law. From the
performance of such duties the President could not relieve them. 55
In this regard, Black's commentary reflects a similar distinction made
by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madion.5 6 In Marbury, the Court fully
acknowledged the narrow sphere of the President's activity in "the exercise
of which he is to use his own discretion," with the aid of his advisers "who
act by his authority, and in conformity with his orders. '5 7 However, this
narrow sphere of constitutionally protected activity represented for Mar-
shall only thefirst phase on the continuum of the decision-making process.
He continued his analysis by stating that "when the legislature proceeds to
impose on that [presidential adviser] 'other duties," those duties must be
executed.5 8 Marshall's conclusion from analyzing these two segments of
the decision-making process is particularly important here. He recognized
the restraint imposed upon the judiciary when reviewing the President's
exercise of political power in the first phase of the decision-making pro-
cess:
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is
vested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of
which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To
aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to ap-
point certain officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity
with his orders.
... [W]here the heads of departments are the political or con-
fidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the
President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses
a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly
clear then that their acts are only politically examinable. 59
The "constitutional ... discretion" involved here is that embodied in the
Opinion Clause. It provides the decision-making process and its partici-
pants with the protection necessary to exercise their political judgment.
Without that protection, the political processes of government, the Presi-
dent's ability to exercise his discretion, and the legitimacy of holding the
President politically accountable for his actions, would suffer incalculable
harm.
55. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57. Id. at 165.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
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IV. NOTIONS OF CONTROL AND DIRECTION
The second notion underlying the constitutional protection the Opin-
ion Clause provides the President is that the President must be permitted
to acquire the information and advice necessary to control and direct the
actions of the executive branch, including the execution of the laws. In this
context, the Opinion Clause not only provides protection for the acquisi-
tion of such information and advice but also provides the President with
the affirmative power to acquire it.
The President's control over the energy and resources of the executive
branch is not to be assumed. While agencies and departments comprise a
single structure, "where presidential word is law, or ought to be,"' 60 the
control of the vast machinery and processes of the executive branch has
often eluded the chief executive. In his study of presidential power,
Richard Neustadt explains why:
Like our governmental structure as a whole, the executive
establishment consists of separated institutions sharing powers.
The President heads one of these; Cabinet officers, agency ad-
ministrators, and military commanders head others. Below the
department level, virtually independent bureau chiefs head many
more. Under midcentury conditions, Federal operations spill
across dividing lines on organization charts; almost every policy
entangles many agencies; almost every program calls for inter-
agency collaboration. Everything somehow involves the President.
But operating agencies owe their existence least of all to one
another and only in some part to him. Each has a separate statu-
tory base; each has its statutes to administer; each deals with a dif-
ferent set of subcommittees at the Capitol. Each has its own
peculiar set of clients, friends, and enemies outside the formal
government. Each has a different set of specialized careerists in-
side its own bailiwick. Our Constitution gives the President the
"take-care" clause and the appointive power. Our statutes give
him central budgeting and a degree of personnel control. All
agency administrators are responsible to him. But they also are
responsible to Congress, to their clients, to their staffs, and to
themselves. In short, they have five masters. Only after all of those
do they owe loyalty to each other. 61
Neustadt's study dealt with presidential power; its source and how to
use it. It is clear, however, that the President's exercise of this power com-
petes with the exercise of power by others both within and without the
executive branch. In this context, Neustadt identified two of the constitu-
tional powers available for the President's use in his effort to both compete
with the other branches and to gain the mastery of his own-the "take-
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care" clause62 and the appointment power.6 3 Each of these powers, prop-
erly used, provides a means for leverage within the executive branch which
the President may utilize to control and direct the actions of his adminis-
tration. James A. Fairlie, in his study on presidential administration, 64
characterized the importance of these powers to the operation of govern-
ment:
Not only does the President exercise much influence over the
personnel of the administration through his powers of nomination
and removal, but he can also control and direct in large degree,
the actions of the administrative officials. The constitutional pro-
visions which authorize this power are those vesting the executive
power in the President, and requiring him to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed. But the principal means by which the
President can make his control effective is the power of removal,
the possibility of which will usually secure obedience to his orders,
while if any official persists in disobedience his removal permits the
appointment of some one who will carry out the President's
wishes. 6
5
It is not likely, of course, that during the Philadelphia convention the
Framers focused with specificity on such notions as control and direction,
although it is reasonable to presume that by vesting the obligation to ex-
ecute the laws in one person the Framers intended to give the President the
administrative powers necessary to fulfill his obligation. Moreover, while
the Constitution does not, by its own terms, establish any departments or
agencies within the executive branch, many of the Framers were members
of the first Congress which, in 1789, established the Departments of
Foreign Affairs,6 6 War,67 Treasury,6 8 the Post Office, 69 and the Attorney
General. 70 In a review of the statutes establishing these departments, in the
general context of examining the relation of the President to the executive
departments, Attorney General Caleb Cushing identified certain of the
constitutional tools given the President to supervise and direct their
actions. Not surprisingly, these tools included, inter alia, the power con-
tained in the Opinion Clause:
62. The President "shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
63. The President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States." U.S.,
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President's power to appoint and remove officers
within the executive is the subject of United States v. Myers, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
64. J. FAIRLIE, NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1905).
65. Id. at 16.
66. Ch. 4, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 28 (1789).
67. 'Ch. 7, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 49 (1789).
68. Ch. 12, §§ 1-8, 1 Stat. 65 (1789).
69. Ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 70 (1789).
70. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93 (1789).
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Now, by the explicit and emphatic language of the Constitu-
tion, the executive power is vested in the President of the United
States, [who has] the duty of general direction and supervision....
[T]he Constitution provides for the subdivision of the executive
powers, vested in the President, among administrative depart-
ments, using that term now in its narrower and ordinary sense.
What those "executive departments" shall be, either in number or
functions, the Constitution does not say, any further than to deter-
mine that certain appointments may be made by their "heads,"
respectively, and that the President may require in writing the ad-
vice of any such "head" or "principal officer in each of the Ex-
ecutive departments," for which reason those officers are
sometimes characterized, and not improperly, as "constitutional
advisers" of the President.' 1
The role of these "constitutional advisers" is essential, in Cushing's words,
"when the President, in regard to some line of public policy to be adopted
by him, or some general or superior direction, demands the written advice
of the Heads of Department. ' 72 It thus becomes apparent that the Opinion
Clause-like the "take care" and appointment power-provides the Presi-
dent with a potentially important tool for controlling and directing the
energy and resources of the executive branch. Through its use, the Presi-
dent is able to assess the attitudes and perceptions of his advisers and,
through them, the various heads of the subordinate bureaus. Moreover, in
addition to its substantive content, a written expression of opinion enables
the President to discern differences in agency positions or potential inter-
nal disagreements which may disrupt or impede his ability to fashion a
coherent executive branch policy. Finally, the use of written opinions per-
mits the President to assess what is acceptable within the vast machinery of
government, and to determine whether his policy-no matter how
coherent or politically necessary-will be effectively executed by those
responsible. In this context the Opinion Clause is an affirmative power, to
be relied upon by the President in gathering the information on matters of
substance and process necessary to control and direct the energy and
resources of the executive branch.
The question remains, however, whether the exercise of this affirma-
tive power can be conditioned or encumbered by the other branches of
government. Generally, the answer must be no. The President alone is
constitutionally responsible for administering the executive branch and
faithfully executing the laws of the nation. In performing these duties the
President must be able to compete with the other branches of government,
which are - as Neustadt suggests - already able to substantially influence
the content and direction of executive policy beyond their own theoretical
constitutional limits. The intrusion of the other branches into the adminis-
71. 7 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 453, 460 (1855).
72. Id. at 478.
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tration of the executive must be minimized if the proper separation among
the branches is to be maintained and the President permitted to consider
freely the appropriate manner for fulfilling his own constitutional obliga-
tions. Thus, the Opinion Clause provides an essential mechanism for
preserving the constitutionally prescribed separation.
As indicated at the outset of this article, there is little judicial guidance
which focuses directly on the meaning of the Opinion Clause. It is essen-
tial, therefore, to be cautious about the weight attributed to matters of
politics and administration when undertaking an inquiry into the "legal"
meaning of a constitutional power. There are, however, certain notions of
law which add credence to the political and administrative matters
discussed thus far.
V. NOTIONS OF LAW
Judicial assessments of various executive powers provide "logical" sup-
port for the meaning of the Opinion Clause suggested in this article. These
powers are the President's obligations to "take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed," his control over appointments, and the judicial protection
accorded executive communications.
In Myers v. United States 1 the Supreme Court considered whether the
President has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to remove ex-
ecutive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with
the consent of the Senate. Congress had directed that "Postmasters ...
shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 74 Myers, a Postmaster, was removed at
the direction of the President without the Senate's consent. In a lengthy
opinion, Chief Justice Taft held that the President did have power to
remove postmasters without the Senate's consent. The Chief Justice
analyzed the President's power to execute the laws and to appoint officers
in the context of the constitutional separation of power among the three
branches of government and concluded that the removal power was essen-
tial to the President's effective exercise of his constitutional and statutory
duties.
The degree of guidance in the discharge of their duties that the
President may exercise over executive officers varies with the
character of their service as prescribed in the law under which they
act. The highest and most important duties which his subordinates
perform are those in which they act for him. In such cases they are
exercising not their own but his discretion. This field is a very large
one. It is sometimes described as political.
In all such cases, the discretion to be exercised is that of the
President in determining the national public interest and in direc-
73. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
74. Id. at 107.
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ting the action to be taken by his executive subordinates to protect
it. In this field his cabinet officers must do his will. He must place
in each member "of his official family, and his chief executive
subordinates, implicit faith. The moment that he loses confidence
in the intelligence, ability, judgment or loyalty of any one of them,
he must have the power to remove him without delay. To require
him to file charges and submit them to the consideration of the
Senate might make impossible that unity and co-ordination in ex-
ecutive administration essential to effective action. 75
The purpose of the Opinion Clause is premised on the same practical and
constitutional considerations. The President must be able to request
opinions from his closest advisers and receive them without Congress im-
posing conditions on either the President's request or the timely transmis-
sion of the opinion.
The judicial determinations that, under certain circumstances, execu-
tive communications can be protected from disclosure are also instructive.
These determinations arise pursuant to requests under rules of procedure
and claims of privilege which are derived, in part, from the common law as
well as the Constitution. 76 However, the rationale supporting the need for
protection is, in part, that certain aspects of the executive decision-making
process must be able to operate freely and without the potential for
disclosure. It is judicial recognition of this rationale which is important
here.
In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States,71 Kaiser filed
a motion for the production of documents in order to acquire information
from the General Services Administration (GSA), pertaining to GSA-
Kaiser contracts, which was not otherwise available to Kaiser or to the
public generally. GSA submitted all the information requested except for
one document, a staff report concerning a particular GSA-Kaiser con-
tract. 78 The Administrator of GSA, in a letter to the Attorney General,
described the document and the reason for not disclosing it:
The document ... contains opinions that were rendered to the
Liquidator of War Assets by a member of his staff concerning a
proposed sale of aluminum plants. Those opinions do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of, or represent the position ultimately
taken by, the Liquidator of War Assets. A disclosure of the con-
tents of documents of this nature would tend to discourage the
staffs of Government agencies preparing such papers from giving
complete and candid advice and could thereby impede effective
administration of the functions of such agencies. 79
75. Id. at 132-34 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1952).
77. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
78. Id. at 943.
79. Id. at 943 n.4.
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The Court of Claims agreed with the Government's position. It charac-
terized the document as "intra-office advice on policy,"8o and analogized it
to "the kind that a banker gets from economists and accountants on a bor-
rower corporation and in the Federal Government the kind that every head
of an agency or department must rely upon for aid in determining a course
of action. s"8' The court correctly recognized, however, that when a govern-
mental rather than a private communication is involved the production of
a document may be subordinate to the general welfare of the community;
that is, the government "must retain privileges for the good of all." 82 The
privilege is supported by the need for "open, frank discussion between
subordinate and chief concerning administrative action.1
8 3
In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena ,84 two West German
corporations brought suit against an East German enterprise, and its
American representatives, to establish the ownership of a trademark. In
order to substantiate their contentions, the West German corporations
sought to subpoena documents held by the Justice Department. The
Government agreed to their submission, except for certain documents it
considered protected by executive privilege. Consequently, the Govern-
ment moved to modify the subpoena. 8
80. Id. at 945.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 946.
83. Id. It is also useful to note that the court relied on United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1940), to substantiate its conclusion. In Morgan the
Secretary of Agriculture had issued an order, under the Packers and Stockyards
Act, Ch. 64 §§'2-408, 42 S-tat. 159 (192T, setting maximum rates to be charged
by market agencies for their services at the Kansas City Stockyards. The market
agencies brought suit to set aside the order. At trial plaintiffs called the Secretary
of Agriculture to testify as to the administrative processes he used in reaching his
decision. The trial court ruled the Secretary's order invalid but was reversed on
appeal by the Supreme Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter noted
that "the Secretary should never have been subjected to this examination." 313
U.S. at 422. The Court's dismay over the obligation of the Secretary to
testify- and thus to subject the decision-making process to judicial and public
purview-was, in part, premised on a "separation of powers" notion. The Court
stated:
Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny, so the integrity of
the administrative process must be equally respected. It will bear
repeating that although the administrative process has had a different
development and pursues somewhat different ways from those of courts,
they are to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the
appropriate independence of each should be respected by the other.
Id. at 422 (citations omitted). This is an admonition to the judiciary to be con-
scious not only of the proper resolution of the specific controversy before it but
also the broader, constitutionally protected independence of executive decision-
making.
84. 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), affd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
85. 313 U.S. at 322. The Attorney General, in an affidavit to the Court,
described these privileged documents as "intra-departmental memoranda ...
[Vol. 44204
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The court granted the Justice Department's motion. It first reviewed
the history and rationale of the Government's claim of privilege in a man-
ner similar to that undertaken by Judge Reed in Kaiser Aluminum86 and
then addressed with particularity the relationship between the rationale
for the privilege and the nature of the decision-making process:
Inextricably intertwined, both in purpose and objective, are
these two principles. The rule immunizing intra-governmental ad-
vice safeguards free expression by eliminating the possibility of
outside examination as an inhibiting factor, but expressions assist-
ing the reaching of a decision are part of the decision-making pro-
cess. Similarly, the so-called "mental process rule" impresses the
stamp of secrecy more directly upon the decision than upon the
advice, but it extends to all phases of the decision-making process,
of which the advice is a part. Each rule complements the other,
and in combination they operate to preserve the integrity of the
deliberative process itself. It is evident that to demand pre-deci-
sion data is at once to probe and imperil that process.8 7
Certainly the court recognized that even the potential imposition of a con-
dition of disclosure would "imperil" and inhibit the proper flow of "pre-
decision" advice. This is not to suggest that all inhibitions on the flow and
substantive content of information are anathema. Such an all-encom-
passing proposition has no support in law or in common sense, as will be
discussed in the next section. However, the district court's discussion here,
and in Kaiser Aluminum, suggests that there is a discrete juncture in the
decision-making process when both law and common sense preclude judi-
cial and congressional intervention. It is the juncture where the President
requests an opinion in writing and his adviser is prepared to respond; that
is, the juncture protected by the Opinion Clause.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS
The preceding sections have focused on the various reasons, political,
administrative and legal in nature, for reading the Opinion Clause as a
source of executive power vesting in the President the right to receive infor-
mation and advice from his close advisers without interference from the
judiciary or the Congress. There are, however, a number of considerations
which, if fully examined, might limit the power and protection embodied
in the Opinion Clause or, conversely, might add legal or practical weight
to it. It is the purpose of this section to identify and explore briefly some of
these considerations in order to suggest direction for further inquiry.
A. The President or the Presidency
In his Opinion as Attorney General, Caleb Cushing noted a particular
containing opinions, recommendations and deliberations pertaining to decisions
the Department was required to make as to litigation." Id. at 323.
86. See text accompanying notes 77-83 supra.
87. 40 F.R.D. at 326 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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reality about the President's duties, prevalent in 1855, and certainly ap-
plicable today:
[T]he actual administration of all executive power cannot be per-
formed personally by one man, - that this would be physically im-
possible, and that if it were attempted by the President, the utmost
ability of that one man would be consumed in official details.88
Moreover, as Justice Jackson indicated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer this reality may have a constitutionally cognizable dimension:
The Constitution does not disclose the measure of the actual con-
trols wielded by the modern presidential office. That instrument
must be understood as an Eighteenth-Century sketch of a govern-
ment hoped for, not as a blueprint of the Government that is ....
Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do not
show on the face of the Constitution. 9
The Opinion Clause, by its terms, identifies the President as the only per-
son who "may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in
each of the executive Departments." However, in light of the growing
complexity of the President's responsibility, it is arguable that the protec-
tion and power embodied in the Opinion Clause may be effectively dele-
gated to a presidential subordinate and, as a related matter, it may also be
"waived" by the President or by a subordinate.90 Obviously, these matters
of delegation and waiver arise only with an expansive interpretation of the
Opinion Clause. While such an interpretation may reflect current reali-
ties, it might also reflect "a distortion of the Framers' work," and does not
seem supportable. 9'
While the Opinion Clause identifies the person giving the opin-
ion as the "principal officer in each of the executive Departments," the
history of the clause's inclusion in the Constitution suggests the Framers
did not intend the "principal officer" to be only the head of a department.
The Framers rejected various efforts to identify particular persons92 and,
of course, only the offices of the President and Vice-President were actually
88. 7 OP. ATT'Y GEN. 453, 460 (1855).
89. 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952).
90. In North Dakota v. Andrus, the State, relying on the decision in United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-97 (1974), argued that the President and his
advisers had waived the protection embodied in the Opinion Clause:
[T]he President would be bound by the CEQ Guidelines since they were
issued by his office. The Council on Environmental Quality is within the
Executive Office of the President. 42 U.S.C. 4342. Therefore, assuming,
arguendo, that the Constitution did confer authority for confidential
communications under the "opinion clause" . .. , issuance of the CEQ
Guidelines would constitute a waiver of confidentiality for one specific
purpose: [the preparation of an environmental impact statement].
Appellee's Brief at 19, North Dakota v. Andrus, No. 78-1194 (8th Cir. March 21,
1978), stay denied by Justice Blackmun (March 23, 1978).
91. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 134 (1977).
92. See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
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established in article II of the Constitution. In North Dakota v. Andrus,
the Government construed the term "principal officer" to be analogous to
a "close adviser" and to include the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality.
Certainly, it is clear from the facts in North Dakota v. Andrus, that
preparation of the Water Policy Report was actually undertaken by sub-
ordinates to these "close advisers," although under their guidance
and direction. Thus, the protection provided by the Opinion Clause
may properly be extended both vertically (below the "principal officer")
into the executive branch, and laterally to various high-level (non-Secre-
tarial) officials. However, the clause expressly provides that the opinion
must be prepared at the President's request. An opinion prepared at the
initiative of an adviser or his subordinate and submitted to the President is
not protected. In this context, therefore, while the power and protection
of the Opinion Clause necessarily encompass certain persons and processes
involved in the administration of the presidency, it does so only when the
President requests the opinion.
B. Inherent Versus Exipress Power
The Opinion Clause was included in the Constitution as an express
power. However, the significance of this decision by the Framers has not
always been obvious.
In The Federalist No. 74, Alexander Hamilton stated that the Opinion
Clause was a "redundancy in the plan [for the executive], as the right for
which it provides would result of itself from the office." 93 A similar view of
the lack of necessity for the clause's inclusion was expressed by Mr. Justice
Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.94 In response to the
Government's contention, that the "executive Power" conferred upon the
President by article I, section 1 "constitutes a grant of all the executive
powers of which the Government is capable," Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
"If that be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to add
several specific items, including some trifling ones. " 95 Among the "items"
Justice Jackson identified was the Opinion Clause, which, he stated,
"would seem to be inherent in the Executive if anything is.",96 Suggesting,
however, that the President has certain "inherent" powers regardless of
their inclusion in the Constitution merely begs the question: why was the
power expressly included and what exactly is its meaning? Neither
Hamilton nor Mr. Justice Jackson explored the question; Hamilton was
more concerned with convincing the New York convention to ratify the
Constitution, 97 and Mr. Justice Jackson's concern was in disputing the
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (A. Hamilton) at 447 (B. Wright ed. 1962).
94. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
95. Id. at 640-41 (footnotes omitted).
96. Id. at 641 n.9.
97. Hamilton's somewhat cryptic remark about the Opinion Clause was not
an isolated incident. In reference to the President's power as commander-in-
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government's broad claim to power. Moreover, it is apparent from a
review of the majority opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer98 (including Mr. Justice Jackson's) that a presidential claim based
on an "inherent" power was neither viewed favorably nor subject to the
same manner of scrutiny as a claim based on a power expressly enumer-
ated.
It is true that the Constitution's silence on the existence of a power is
not dispositive. 99 Myers v. United States'00 demonstrates that the Presi-
dent's power of removal, although not expressly included in the Constitu-
tion, is, under the appropriate circumstance, commensurate with the
power of appointment.1 0' But there is a profound difference, in the legal
and psychological "mix" of a controversy affecting the judicial tempera-
ment, when the President's conduct can be directly correlated to an ex-
press constitutional power rather than to an "aggregate" of powers located
within the general confines of article II. The conduct undertaken by the
President and his advisers, challenged by the State of North Dakota in
North Dakota v. Andrus, is directly correlated to the conduct described in
the Opinion Clause. The Government did not rely upon any notion of
"silent," "inherent," or "aggregate" powers and, in fact, expressly es-
chewed any such reliance. 0 2 Consequently, any judicial resolution of a
chief, contained in the same section and clause as the Opinion Clause, Hamilton
stated:
The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself and it is at the same
time so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general,
that little need be said to explain or explore it.
THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (A. Hamilton) at 473 (B. Wright ed. 1962). Apparently,
as a political matter, Hamilton thought understatement and brevity the most
effective methods of persuasion.
98. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
99. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.16 (1974).
100. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
101. Cf. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
102. The Government stated in its reply brief:
The [State of North Dakota's] response first enlarges and then distorts
the precise, and constitutionally supportable, limits on the President's
position. The United States relies on the "Opinion Clause," an
enumerated power of the Presidency specifically identified in the Con-
stitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1. The State, in complete
disregard of the pre-1787 "Executive" experiences examined by the
Framers and the particularized concern addressed to the same subject at
the Philadelphia Convention, concludes that this provision in the Con-
stitution is "mere surplusage" [relying, in part, on Hamilton's statement
in THE FEDERALIST No. 74]. We decline, and we know this Court will
decline, to treat the Constitution in such a cavalier fashion. Moreover,
the State continues by then insisting that in order to resolve this con-
troversy, the Court must examine the breadth of the President's "in-
herent powers," none of which are expressly identified in the Constitu-
tion. We have made no claim based on any such "notion." Consequently,
most of the State's "arguments" are in fact addressed to its own con-
208 [Vol. 44
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confrontation between the executive and legislative branches must deal
directly with the executive's reliance on an expressed constitutional power.
It is in this context of judicial review that the significance of the Opinion
Clause as an express power becomes readily apparent.
C. Balancing of Constitutional Rights and Powers
The power and protection embodied in the Opinion Clause cannot be
evaluated fully by assessing its terms alone.
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. . . . Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress. 1 03
Consequently, the meaning of the Opinion Clause, and the judicial man-
ner of evaluating it, is dependent, in part, on the seemingly obvious fact
that there are three branches of government.
The separation of powers concept was discussed in the introductory
portion of Part II. As suggested there, the Framers devised a system of
government that is composed of three "separate" branches, but with the
particularized imposition of "checks and balances." This suggests, of
course, that the independence claimed by the executive is not, by itself,
dispositive of a disagreement with the other branches. It is necessary first
to inquire into the powers available to Congress and the judiciary, and the
manner in which the Supreme Court has assessed competing claims among
the branches. 104 As the decisions in Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
cocted notion of "inherent powers," and not to the precise, and clearly
supportable, position of the President. These arguments, while in-
teresting, are wholly irrelevant.
Appellant's Reply Brief at 4-5, North Dakota v. Andrus, No. 78-1194 (8th Cir.
March 21, 1978), stay denied by Justice Blackmun (March 23, 1978) (citations
omitted).
103. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
104. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 707 (1974), the Court
reiterated the settled proposition that while each branch may initially interpret
the nature of its constitutional powers the ultimate arbiter is the Supreme
Court-a proposition acknowledged by the Government in North Dakota v.
Andrus. See note 14 infra. While this proposition was once the basis for con-
troversy, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 218 (1926) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting), it is now a mere truism; an undeniable description of the Supreme
Court's role under article III. But identifying who decides what powers each
branch possesses adds little to the determination of what those powers are and
whether they may be exercised independently of the other branches. Thus the
Court's conclusion in United States v. Nixon concerning its role in constitutional
adjudication, while critically important in dealing with the former President's
claim, is only marginally relevant to the separation of powers discussion involved
here.
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vices'0 and Buckley v. Valeo10 6 indicate, the Court has established subtle,
but important, distinctions in reviewing presidential claims based on ex-
press rather than inherent powers.
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services'07 the Court considered
whether congressional enactment of the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act,108 which directs the Administrator of the
General Services Administration (GSA) to control the disposition of Presi-
dent Nixon's tape recorded conversations, violated the principle of separa-
tion of powers. Specifically, the former President contended that "Con-
gress is without power to delegate to a subordinate officer of the Executive
Branch the decision whether to disclose Presidential materials and to
prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure. To do so ... constitutes,
without more, an impermissible interference by the Legislative Branch
into matters inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch."' 0 9
The President did not identify a particular provision in article II to sup-
port his proposition.
The manner in which the Court reviewed the President's claim is in-
structive. It stated:
[I]n determining whether the [Presidential Recordings] Act
disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the
proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Ex-
ecutive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must
we then determine whether that impact is justified by an over-
riding need to promote objectives within the constitutional
authority of Congress.' 10
This places a substantial burden on the President. He must affirmatively
demonstrate, as a factual matter, the "extent to which" an Act of Congress
"disrupts" his ability to "accomplish" a "constitutionally assigned" func-
tion.'1 ' Once it is demonstrated to the court's satisfaction (presumably by a
preponderance of the evidence) that the Act has the "potential for disrup-
ting" such a "constitutionally assigned" function, the court then will deter-
mine whether the exercise of a congressional power to promote a par-
ticular objective justifies the actual disruption which, presumably, will oc-
cur.
105. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
106. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
107. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
108. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
109. 433 U.S. at 440.
110. Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
111. The President must show that the Act, by displacing or disrupting his
ability to exercise a power inherent in the President, would in turn disrupt his
ability to accomplish a "constitutionally assigned" function, that is, a function ex-
pressly identified in the Constitution.
[Vol. 44
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The former President was unable to meet the first part of the burden.
Consequently, the Court made no particularized assessment of whether
Congress, in fact, acted pursuant to an express constitutional poler.112
The burden on the President, in substantiating a claim based on an in-
herent constitutional power, is, indeed, exacting.
The Court's inquiry into a presidential claim based on an express con-
stitutional power is perceptibly different. Generally, the initial burden
placed on the President is substantially less, and an affirmative and strin-
gent burden to substantiate the power of Congress is placed on the party
advocating such a position. The Court then engages in an analysis of each
claim in order to identify, with precision, which branch- acting alone-
exercises the discrete but absolute control over the subject matter in
dispute. This method of inquiry is apparent from a review of Buckley v.
Valeo. 31
In Buckley v. Valeo, plaintiffs brought suit to challenge on constitu-
tional grounds various provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended in 1974.114 The plaintiffs' claims were directed primarily to
whether the Act's limitation on contributions and expenditures violated
certain first amendment rights protecting the freedom of association and
communication. The plaintiffs also challenged the method of choosing the
members of the Federal Election Commission, which was composed of the
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, serving as ex officio
members of the Commission without the right to vote, two members ap-
pointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of
the House, and two by the President. Each of the six voting members were
confirmed by the majority of both Houses of Congress. The plaintiffs
argued that this method of selection violated the "separation of powers"
concept, because Congress had intruded upon a power left exclusively to
the executive. The Supreme Court summarized the plaintiffs' argument in
the following manner:
Appellants urge that since Congress has given the Commission
wide-ranging rulemaking and enforcement powers with respect to
the substantive provisions of the Act, Congress is precluded under
the principle of separation of powers from vesting in itself the
authority to appoint those who will exercise such authority. Their
112. The Court stated that "[s]uch regulation of material generated in the
Executive Branch has never been considered invalid as an invasion of its
automony. Cf. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973); FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S.
255 (1975)." 433 U.S. at 455 (footnotes omitted). However, neither Mink nor
Robertson involved a particularized assessment of Congress' constitutional power
to act;.in fact, in Robertson, there were "no constitutional claims." 422 U.S. at
261.
113. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
114. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
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argument is based on the language of Art. II, § 2, c. 2, of the Con-
stitution, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
Appellants' argument is that this provision is the exclusive
method by which those charged with executing the laws of the
United States may be chosen.11 5
The Commission, on the other hand, contended that the "Framers ....
while mindful of the need for checks and balances among the three
branches of the National Government, had no intention of denying to the
Legislative Branch authority to appoint its own officers" pursuant to its
substantive authority over elections and the Necessary and Proper
Clause,116 and the "'Inherent power of Congress' to appoint its own offi-
cers to perform functions necessary to that body as an institution."11 7
The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs. After reviewing the
separation of powers concept as understood by Montesquieu, the Framers,
and its previous decisions, 1 the Court examined the debates at Philadel-
phia in 1787 to determine the meaning of the Appointment Clause. It
concluded the appointment power could not be exercised by Congress not-
withstanding Congress' express constitutional power to legislate in the
substantive area of elections. The Court stated:
[C]ongress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has sub-
stantive legislative jurisdiction so long as the exercise of that
authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction.
We see no reason to believe that the authority of Congress over
federal election practices is of such a wholly different nature from
the other grants of authority to Congress that it may be employed
in such a manner as to offend well-established constitutional
restrictions stemming from the separation of powers.119
Moreover, the Court rejected the Commission's contention that "whatever
shortcomings the provisions for the appointment of members of the Com-
mission might have under Art. II, Congress had ample authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I to effectuate this result.' 120 This
misperceives the question, the Court stated. "The proper inquiry when
115. 424 U.S. at 118.
116. Id. at 119.
117. Id. at 127.
118. Id. at 120-24.
119. Id. at 132 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 134.
212. [Vol. 44
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considering the Necessary and Proper Clause is not the authority of Con-
gress to create an office or a commission, which is broad indeed, but rather
its authority to provide that its own officers may make appointments to
such office or commission."12' Framed in this fashion, Congress has no
more authority than under its substantive grants; it cannot "vest in itself,
or its officers, the authority to appoint officers of the United States when
the Appointments Clause by clear implication prohibits it from doing
SO.1'122
Thus, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court recognized that Con-
gress could act pursuant to its own expressed constitutional powers "so long
as the exercise of that authority [through the enactment of a statute] does
not ... offend well-established constitutional restrictions stemming from
the separation of powers.'1 23 The "well-established constitutional restric-
tion" was the affirmative grant of power given to the President in the Ap-
pointment Clause; a power more essential in its relation to the "executive
power" than the implied power to remove officers once appointed sus-
tained in United States v. Myers.124 To permit Congress to enact legislation
which would impede or preclude the executive from properly exercising its
own expressed constitutional powers would dilute the separation of powers
concept and leave the executive without any cognizable claim of inde-
pendence. In the final analysis, the executive, when making a claim based
on an expressed constitutional power, must make aprimafacie showing of
(1) the existence of a demonstrable parallel between its action and an
expressed power contained in article II, and (2) the fact that an act of
Congress may prevent or disrupt the executive from properly utilizing that
expressed power.
The conduct of the President described in North Dakota v. Andrus
was demonstrably correlated to the conduct described in the Opinion
Clause. Moreover, for the court to have required the Water Resources
Council to prepare an environmental impact statement would have pre-
vented the President from properly utilizing the constitutionally assigned
power contained in the Opinion Clause. The Government's reliance on the
Opinion Clause in any future litigation will have to meet this same
burden. 125
121. Id. at 134-35.
122. Id. at 135.
123. Id. at 132.
124. Id. at 135-36. See also discussion of Myers v. United States in text
accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
125. While this portion of Part VI has focused on the constitutional relation-
ship between the legislative and executive branches, the responsibility of the
judicial branch under article III vis-A-vis the executive is also of importance. This
responsibility is particularly pertinent in protecting the constitutional rights of
individuals.
The Supreme Court has reviewed with "exacting scrutiny" legislative or ex-
ecutive action which trench on fundamental personal liberties, including first
1979]
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VII. CONCLUSION
The propositions put forth in this article concerning the meaning of
the Opinion Clause may seem novel. However, the novelty, as an historical
matter, is more the consequence of jurisprudential inadvertence than an
effort to breathe life into a power not otherwise existent. The Framers
placed in article II the express power to request opinions in writing. This
essay has attempted to define the nature and limit of that power.
Some may grasp the propositions contained here and suggest, in turn,
that the Opinion Clause provides the executive with a previously unrecog-
nized power to act vis-a-vis the other branches. The power and protection
embodied in the Opinion Clause may provide the President with an impor-
tant tool in mastering his own substantive and procedural tasks and in
maintaining the proper balance among the branches. Beyond serving this
purpose, however, the Opinion Clause should be invoked with great cau-
tion in the context of litigation. 2 6 It is essential for the executive -no less
amendment association rights, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976),
speech, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971), and no-
tions of privacy, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 525-33
(1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This exacting manner of review is also apparent
in criminal proceedings.
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the President's claim of
privilege, premised on an inherent constitutional protection, was not sufficient to
overcome "our historic commitment to the rule of law." Id. at 708. After
"weighing" these matters, the Court concluded that presidential communications
must be submitted to the district court because "the generalized interest in con-
fidentiality .... cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of
law in the fair administration of criminal justice." Id. at 713.
126. Since its reliance on the Opinion Clause in North Dakota v. Andrus, the
Justice Department has sought to protect the presidential decision-making pro-
cess in two subsequent cases on the same constitutional basis.
In Alaska v. Carter, No. A78-291 Civil (D. Alaska Nov. 27, 1978), Alaska
sought to require the Secretary of Interior to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement before he could respond to the President's request for advice concern-
ing the designation of public lands as national monuments under the Antiquities
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1906). The district court rejected this argument. Citing the
Opinion Clause, the court stated:
On November 16, 1978, the President requested Secretary Andrus to
provide him with recommendations on the suitability of lands in Alaska
for designation as national monuments under the Antiquities Act of
1906. For a court to require that an impact statement must be filed after
the specified comment period before the President could receive the
recommendations of the Secretary would raise serious constitutional
questions .... Applying the impact statement process to such recom-
mendations necessarily burden and inhibit "the policy of open, frank
discussion between subordinate and chief concerning administrative ac-
tion." For these reasons the court holds that any recommendations by the
Secretary of Interior on the exercise of the President's power under the
Antiquities Act, which recommendations have been requested by the
President, do not come under the NEPA impact statement. process.
Memorandum and Order, Alaska v. Carter, No. A78-291 Civil (D. Alaska Nov.
[Vol. 44214
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law. issouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/1
THE OPINION CLAUSE
than the legislature and judiciary- to exercise its powers with reason and
self-restraint, and to forego claims of power which will provoke constitu-
tional "clashes between different branches of the government ... if a legal
[or political] ground of less explosive potentialities is properly available
... "127 "[T]he long view of the immediate parties in interest [is to] find
ready accommodation for differences."' 28
To those who must defend the President and his close advisers in a
court of law, the propositions set forth in this article are particularly im-
portant. Certainly, the absence of dispositive judicial guidance concerning
the meaning of the Opinion Clause accentuates the need for a deliberate
and thorough inquiry in advance of litigation. It is endemic to the litiga-
tion process, however, that the demands of immediate issues leave little
27, 1978) 7-8 (footnotes and citations omitted). No appeal was taken from this
portion of the decision.
In Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3463 (1979), the Justice Department has sought review of the court of
appeals decision requiring the Interior Department to prepare an EIS on its
wildlife management programs prior to submitting its annual budget requests to
the President's Office of Management and Budget. Although the court of appeals
was not presented with an Opinion Clause argument, the Government raised it in
its petition for certiorari:
[C]onstitutional questions might be posed by congressional re-
quirements that executive agencies and OMB expand the contents of
budgetary materials they send the President by including environmental
impact statements and that they make those statements public. The
president has authority to receive information from departments and
agencies, and from advisers within his Executive Office, free from
congressional and judicial regulation. See, e.g., Article II, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Andrus v. Sierra Club, No. 78-625 (Oct. 12,
1978), at 20 n.19, cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (1979).
It is readily apparent in both cases that the integrity of the presidential
decision-making process is directly affected by the imposition of an Environ-
mental Impact Statement requirement. However, the substantive area of
presidential decision-making which seems most amenable to the possible ap-
plication of the Opinion Clause is the formulation of foreign, military and
national security policy. Oftentimes the President's participation in these matters
is direct and essential, and the need for timely, candid advice is vital to both the
"quiet" formulation of a position and the imposition of the presidential per-
spective alone. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 76-77, 83 (1973); Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Helkin v. Helms, No. 77-1922 (D.C. Cir. June
16, 1978); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783,
788, 796 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). See also Washington Star,
April 22, 1978 (Editorial) at A-10, col. 1; Washington Post, April 19, 1978, at
A-13, col. 5. Moreover, there already exists a tradition of judicial restraint in
each of these areas. See, e.g., Helkin v. Helms, No. 77-1922, slip op. at 14 (D.C.
Cir. June 16, 1978); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 955-57 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mit-
chell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
127. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 614.
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time to penetrate their deeper meaning or to explore the utility of their ap-
plication in a variety of general factual settings. Such a luxury is, indeed,
rare. But the result, oftentimes, is that choices made pragmatically to
resolve specific questions may affect substantive government policy well
beyond the four comers of a particular lawsuit. Here we are dealing with
presidential decision-making, where matters of law and politics are closely
entwined and controversy and expedition will necessarily temper the man-
ner in which litigation is handled and legal issues are resolved. It is essen-
tial, therefore, that when possible matters of such an important and
delicate nature be assessed fully in advance and the propriety of their use
in future litigation examined and understood.
The Opinion Clause may, of course, retain its obscurity in the history
of jurisprudence. As this article suggests, however, the Opinion Clause is
of considerable significance in defining the breadth of power possessed by
the nation's chief executive.
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